Security comes first because energy systems are infrastructure.
NovaFir develops clean-energy technology for buyers who need confidence in how equipment is sourced, secured, updated, monitored and supported over time.
Security designed in, from sourcing to operation.
Three commitments that procurement teams, auditors and security reviewers can evaluate.
Supply-chain transparency
A critical-path sourcing preference outside China for controllers, power semiconductors, communications silicon, secure elements, firmware and cybersecurity-bearing components, weighed against quality, availability, lifecycle and certification. Commodity parts are managed through best-efforts diversification.
SBOM and HBOM disclosure
Software and hardware bill-of-materials practices designed to support customer diligence, audit and regulatory review under appropriate confidentiality terms, with component traceability.
Secure by design
Hardware-rooted device identity, mutual authentication, encrypted telemetry, signed firmware with rollback, secure boot, least privilege, role-based access and auditable operational actions.
The platform advises. Safety stays bounded.
NovaCloud and ASCEND use forecasting, anomaly detection, optimization models and diagnostic analysis to support decisions. They do not hold autonomous authority over critical, safety-affecting or material decisions, and they do not write setpoints into third-party equipment.
Designed around OT security expectations.
NovaFir’s OT architecture is informed by IEC 62443 and NIST SP 800-82 principles, including segmentation, least privilege, authenticated communications, device identity, signed updates and auditable access.
These are design and alignment references, not achieved certification claims. Product electrical, grid, safety and market-specific certification pathways are discussed separately and described as planned or targeted until achieved.
The controls behind the commitments.
Integrations are support-scoped.
Connecting equipment NovaFir did not build raises its own security questions. Both integration products answer them the same way: observe what is authorized, change nothing.
Supported third-party connectivity
- ›Third-party integrations are support-scoped rather than open-ended
- ›Credentials and tokens are handled securely and scoped to purpose
- ›No plain-text storage of customer OEM credentials
- ›Customer and user authorization is respected and explicit where required
- ›Read-only is the current default posture
- ›Integration health and data provenance visible in NovaCloud
Commercial and industrial sites
- ›OT segmentation as a core design consideration
- ›Secure device identity and signed software and firmware
- ›Read-only default and supervisory integration boundary for existing OEM assets
- ›Local buffering so connectivity loss is a reporting gap, not an operational one
- ›Historian and SCADA coexistence rather than replacement
- ›Fits the customer’s segmentation model and approved communication paths
Existing OEM protection, inverter control, turbine control, hydro governors, battery management systems and other certified machine-control systems remain authoritative. NovaFir claims no autonomous dispatch, remote setpoint writing, switching, black start, islanding or direct OEM control as current capability.
Evaluating a secure energy platform?
We welcome conversations with procurement teams, security reviewers and commercial buyers who need diligence-grade answers on sourcing, disclosure and OT security.
